Khunti’s sedition cases go back to 2017, and the start of the “Pathalgadi movement”. Adivasis who were faced with corporate takeover of their land resorted to an innovative form of protest: they began to carve provisions of the Indian Constitution’s Fifth Schedule — that guarantees tribal autonomy — upon stone slabs placed upon the boundaries of the village. The first information reports (FIRs) that follow allege that the police were attacked with “sticks and traditional weapons” (an allegation that the Adivasis dispute); but additionally, the FIRs also state that the leaders of the movement have been “misleading the innocent people in the name of scheduled areas”, and “erecting stone slabs presenting wrong interpretation of the Constitution”. As a result of these FIRs, individuals spent many months in jail.
The ongoing events in Khunti reveal multiple fault lines in the legal system, and multiple faults in those who implement it. A century-and-a-half after it was first enacted into the Indian Penal Code by the colonial government, the vague, ambiguous, and unclear wording of the sedition provision continues to make it ripe for abuse. Sedition is defined as “disaffection” against the government, or bringing it into “hatred or contempt”.

It should be immediately obvious that the scope of these words is boundless, and boundlessly manipulable. However, when the sedition law was challenged in 1962, the Supreme Court of India chose to uphold it, while claiming to “narrow it down”. The court noted that only acts that had a “tendency” to cause public disorder would fall within the scope of the section.

As the years since that judgement has shown, however, this dictum had no impact whatsoever on the abuse of the sedition law. To start with “tendency to cause public disorder” was almost as vague as the text or the original section. Second, as long as the section continued to exist in the form that it did, the police could, and did continue to invoke it to stifle protest and dissent; and trial courts could and did continue to refuse bail to jailed people. The failure, thus, extended to every wing of the state: to Parliament, for allowing the provision to remain on the statute books, to the Supreme Court for not striking it down when it had the chance, to State governments and State police, that have found in it a ready tool of oppression, and to lower courts, that enable prolonged incarceration of people under the section.

It hardly needs to be said that “encounters” — and “fake encounters” — take place because there do not exist adequate structures of accountability. Without those structures, the police effectively operate in a zone of impunity. In 2009, the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh passed a landmark judgement, in which it attempted to create a regime of accountability. Central to this regime was the requirement that encounter deaths would be investigated as if they were murder cases. An FIR would have to be registered against the police officers responsible for the encounter, and to the extent that they invoked self-defence, they would have to prove it.

The High Court’s judgement, however, was stayed by the Supreme Court, which then passed a series of vague and unclear guidelines a few years later, on the same subject. Even this regime, however, was given a go-by in the recent Telangana encounter case, where, acting on a public interest litigation, the Supreme Court stayed all pending proceedings (including before the Telangana High Court, which was following the guidelines), and handed over the investigation to a “committee”, with a six-month reporting period, to boot.

The Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh incidents show that the rule of law and the Constitution continue to fail those who need it the most, and in the places where it is needed the most. And the root cause of this failure is the active complicity of the very actors who we most expect to maintain the rule of law: clearly, abusive laws are enacted by Parliament, upheld by courts, misused by the police, and sanctioned (again) by courts.

Question : What is the root cause of the failure of the rule of law and the Constitution in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh?

Lack of awareness among citizens

Ineffective government policies

Active complicity of various factors

Lack of financial resources

View Solution

Concepts Covered - 1

Section 121 to 123

Understanding Offences Against State (Section 121 to 123):

Offences against the state are among the gravest crimes in criminal law. They encompass actions that directly endanger the sovereignty, security, and integrity of a nation.
Sections 121 to 123 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) specifically target these offenses, encompassing a wide range of activities aimed at overthrowing the government, engaging in warfare against India, or conspiring to carry out such acts.

Section 121 - Waging, or Attempting to Wage, War against the Government of India:

Section 121 pertains to instances where individuals or groups actively attempt to wage war against the Government of India or provide assistance to such attempts.
Example: If a group of individuals not only plans but takes substantial steps towards initiating an armed rebellion against the Indian government, with the explicit intention of overthrowing it, they can be charged under Section 121.

Section 122 - Collecting Arms, Etc., with the Intention of Waging War against the Government of India:

Section 122 focuses on the act of gathering, stockpiling, or procuring arms, ammunition, or other resources with a specific intention of waging war against the Government of India.
Example: If an individual or a group amasses a substantial quantity of weapons, explosives, or other tools of violence with the explicit intent to use them in a revolt against the Indian government, they could potentially face charges under Section 122.

Section 123 - Concealing with Intent to Facilitate Design to Wage War:

This section centers on individuals who knowingly hide information that could be crucial for planning and executing actions to wage war against the Government of India.
Example: If someone becomes aware of a planned terrorist attack targeting a government institution or facility and intentionally conceals this information to aid the attackers, they could be held liable under Section 123.

Case Law: Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962)

Constitutional Challenge: The case examined the constitutional validity of Section 124A (sedition) of the IPC.
Article 19(1)(a) and Restrictions: It revolved around reconciling freedom of speech (Article 19(1)(a)) with reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, security, and state sovereignty.
Distinguishing Advocacy and Incitement: The court emphasized the difference between legitimate criticism and actions inciting violence or rebellion.
Balancing Individual Rights and State Interests: The ruling highlighted the need to balance citizens' expression rights with the state's obligation to prevent activities endangering stability and security.
Validating Sedition Law: The Supreme Court upheld Section 124A (sedition) but clarified that it should only apply when there's direct incitement to violence or intent to forcibly overthrow the government.
Preventing Misuse: The judgment aimed to prevent misuse of sedition charges against genuine dissent.
Preserving Fundamental Freedoms: The case underscored the significance of safeguarding free speech while recognizing the state's interest in maintaining public order and national integrity.

Impact and Connection to Offences Against State (Sections 121 to 123):

Influence: The case indirectly influences the interpretation of Sections 121 to 123, emphasizing the careful balance between individual rights and state interests.
Nuanced Approach: It reinforces the principle that laws related to offenses against the state should be applied judiciously, avoiding curtailment of freedom without direct incitement to violence or rebellion.
Guiding Principle: Kedar Nath Singh case sets a guiding precedent for addressing offenses against the state while respecting fundamental freedoms.

Indian Constitution and Case Law Studies:

Article 19(1)(a): While the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, it also acknowledges that this right can be reasonably restricted to preserve public order and safeguard national integrity.
In the case of Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate (1973), the court clarified that while the Constitution protects advocacy and dissent, it does not extend the same protection to incitement of violence or rebellion.