AIBE 21 Expected Questions - Expected Questions You Must Practice

AIBE 21 Expected Questions

Candidates can find the AIBE 21 most expected question from each of the topics below:

Constitutional Law

Q.1. Which Article of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to constitutional remedies and is described by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as the 'heart and soul' of the Constitution?

(A) Article 19 (B) Article 21 (C) Article 32 (D) Article 226

Answer: (C) Article 32

Explanation: Article 32 gives every citizen the right to move the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Dr. Ambedkar called it the 'heart and soul' of the Constitution. Article 226 is the High Court's writ jurisdiction — a broader but constitutionally separate power.

Q.2. Given below are two statements, one labelled as Assertion (A) and the other as Reason (R).

Assertion (A): The Preamble to the Constitution of India can be amended under Article 368.

Reason (R): The Preamble is part of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973).

Which one of the following is correct?

(A) Both (A) and (R) are true, and (R) is the correct explanation of (A) (B) Both (A) and (R) are true, but (R) is not the correct explanation of (A) (C) (A) is true, but (R) is false (D) (A) is false, but (R) is true

Answer: (A) Both (A) and (R) are true, and (R) is the correct explanation of (A)

Explanation: In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court overruled Berubari Union (1960) and held that the Preamble IS part of the Constitution and therefore amendable under Article 368 — but the Basic Structure cannot be destroyed. The 42nd Amendment (1976) later added 'Socialist', 'Secular', and 'Integrity' to the Preamble, validating this position.

Q.3. Read the following statements and choose the correct option.

Statement 1: Under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once (doctrine of double jeopardy).

Statement 2: The protection under Article 20(2) applies even where the earlier prosecution resulted in an acquittal, not just a conviction.

(A) Both Statements 1 and 2 are true (B) Only Statement 1 is true (C) Only Statement 2 is true (D) Both Statements 1 and 2 are false

Answer: (B) Only Statement 1 is true

Explanation: Statement 1 is correct — Article 20(2) enshrines the doctrine of double jeopardy. Statement 2 is false — the protection applies only when the earlier proceeding ended in prosecution AND punishment (i.e., conviction and sentence). If a person was acquitted, they can be re-tried because there was no previous 'punishment'. This was clarified in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2012).

Criminal Law (BNS / IPC / BNSS)

Q.4. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, what is the equivalent of the old IPC Section 302 (punishment for murder)?

(A) Section 100 (B) Section 101 (C) Section 103 (D) Section 105

Answer: (C) Section 103

Explanation: Section 103 of the BNS 2023 prescribes punishment for murder, equivalent to Section 302 IPC. Section 100 BNS covers culpable homicide not amounting to murder, Section 101 covers culpable homicide by causing the death of a person other than the one intended, and Section 105 covers abetment of suicide.

Q.5. A, without any intention to cause death, strikes B during a sudden quarrel. B dies. A claims his act falls under 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. Which of the following correctly identifies the relevant exception under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?

(A) Exception 1 — act done in good faith for the benefit of the person (B) Exception 2 — provocation (C) Exception 4 — sudden fight without premeditation (D) Exception 5 — consent of the victim

Answer: (C) Exception 4 — sudden fight without premeditation

Explanation: Exception 4 to Section 100 BNS (corresponding to Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC) provides that culpable homicide is not murder if committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner.

Q.6. Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, what is the maximum period for which an arrested person can be detained in police custody (as opposed to judicial custody) during the initial period of investigation?

(A) 7 days (B) 15 days (C) 60 days (D) 90 days

Answer: (B) 15 days

Explanation: Under Section 187 BNSS 2023, the Magistrate can authorise detention in police custody for a maximum of 15 days in total (not necessarily at a stretch). Beyond 15 days, the accused may only be kept in judicial custody. The overall custody limits are 90 days for offences punishable with death/life imprisonment and 60 days for others — but police custody within these periods is capped at 15 days total.

Q.7. Read the following statements regarding Section 34 and Section 149 of the IPC (now corresponding provisions of the BNS 2023).

Statement 1: Section 34 IPC (common intention) requires a prior meeting of minds before the act is committed.

Statement 2: Section 149 IPC (common object) can apply even without a prior meeting of minds, provided the member was aware that the offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object.

(A) Both Statements 1 and 2 are false (B) Only Statement 1 is true (C) Only Statement 2 is true (D) Both Statements 1 and 2 are true

Answer: (C) Only Statement 2 is true

Explanation: Statement 1 is false — common intention under Section 34 does not require a prior meeting of minds; it can develop on the spot (Mahboob Shah v. King Emperor, 1945). What is required is a pre-arranged plan, which can form at the very moment of the act. Statement 2 is correct — Section 149 IPC imposes constructive liability on all members of an unlawful assembly for any offence committed in prosecution of the common object, or which members knew was likely to be committed.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Q.8. Under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, within how many days from the date of service of summons must the defendant file his written statement?

(A) 15 days (B) 30 days (C) 60 days (D) 90 days

Answer: (B) 30 days

Explanation: Order VIII Rule 1 CPC requires the defendant to file his written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons. Courts may extend this in exceptional circumstances, but the total period cannot exceed 90 days from the date of service of summons.

Q.9. Under which provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can a court stay a suit when the same matter is pending in another court of competent jurisdiction?

(A) Section 9 (B) Section 10 (C) Section 11 (D) Order XXXIX Rule 1

Answer: (B) Section 10

Explanation: Section 10 CPC deals with the stay of suit — where a suit involving the same matter between the same parties is pending before another competent court, the later suit must be stayed. Section 11 deals with Res Judicata (applies after a final decision), while Section 10 applies to a pending prior suit.

Q.10. A files a suit against B for recovery of money. The court passes an ex parte decree against B. B applies to set aside the decree under Order IX Rule 13. Which of the following grounds will NOT entitle B to have the ex parte decree set aside?

(A) B was not duly served the summons (B) B was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing (C) There was irregularity in service of summons and B had no knowledge of the hearing date (D) B was aware of the hearing date but was merely busy with personal work

Answer: (D) B was aware of the hearing date but was merely busy with personal work

Explanation: Under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, an ex parte decree can be set aside if: (i) summons was not duly served, or (ii) the defendant was prevented by 'sufficient cause' from appearing. Mere personal busyness does not constitute 'sufficient cause'. The Supreme Court has consistently held that 'sufficient cause' must be something beyond the party's control, not a casual choice not to attend.

Evidence (IEA / Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023)

Q.11. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which Section deals with opinions of experts (formerly Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872)?

(A) Section 36 (B) Section 38 (C) Section 39 (D) Section 46

Answer: (B) Section 38

Explanation: Section 38 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 corresponds to Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and deals with opinions of experts in matters of foreign law, science, art, handwriting, or finger impressions. Sections 36, 39, and 46 deal with other provisions of relevancy and admissibility.

Q.12. Given below are two statements, one labelled as Assertion (A) and the other as Reason (R).

Assertion (A): A confession made by an accused while in police custody is generally inadmissible under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

Reason (R): Such confessions are excluded to prevent coercion and to protect the accused from self-incrimination.

(A) Both (A) and (R) are true, and (R) is the correct explanation of (A) (B) Both (A) and (R) are true, but (R) is not the correct explanation of (A) (C) (A) is true, but (R) is false (D) (A) is false, but (R) is true

Answer: (A) Both (A) and (R) are true, and (R) is the correct explanation of (A)

Explanation: Both statements are correct, and R correctly explains A. Confessions in police custody are inadmissible (equivalent to Sections 25–26 IEA) to prevent coercive interrogation practices and to protect the right against self-incrimination guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. An exception exists where the confession is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.

Q.13. Read the following statements regarding dying declarations.

Statement 1: A dying declaration is admissible even if the deceased did not know at the time of making the statement that death was impending.

Statement 2: A dying declaration requires corroboration before it can be acted upon to convict an accused.

(A) Both Statements are true (B) Only Statement 1 is true (C) Only Statement 2 is true (D) Both Statements are false

Answer: (B) Only Statement 1 is true

Explanation: Statement 1 is true — a dying declaration is admissible even if the declarant did not believe death was imminent, as long as the statement was made in circumstances where death became the cause of the proceedings (Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, 1939; Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958). Statement 2 is false — a dying declaration does not require corroboration as a rule of law. If found reliable and trustworthy, it can solely form the basis of conviction.

Contract Law

Q.14. Under Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which of the following is a valid consideration?

(A) A past act done without the promisor's request (B) An act done at the promisor's desire, even if past (C) A natural love and affection without any written document (D) A promise to do something already legally required

Answer: (B) An act done at the promisor's desire, even if past

Explanation: Under Section 2(d), consideration must be at the 'desire of the promisor' but can be past, present, or future. An act done at the promisor's past desire IS valid consideration (Sindha Shri Ganpatsingji v. Abraham, 1895). The critical condition is that it was done at the promisor's request — an act done voluntarily without any such request cannot constitute consideration.

Q.15. A, a government servant, promises B that he will use his official position to get B's tender approved in exchange for Rs. 5,000. This agreement is:

(A) Valid, as it is based on consideration (B) Voidable at the option of B (C) Void, as it is opposed to public policy (D) Valid, as both parties consented freely

Answer: (C) Void, as it is opposed to public policy

Explanation: Under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement is void if its object or consideration is opposed to public policy. An agreement to use a public office for private gain is clearly opposed to public policy and is therefore void ab initio. No remedy is available to either party under such an agreement.

Q.16. Read the following statements under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Statement 1: In an indemnity contract, the indemnifier's liability arises only after the indemnity holder has actually suffered a loss and paid it.

Statement 2: The Supreme Court in Gajanan Moreshwar v. Moreshwar Madan (1942) held that an indemnity holder can compel the indemnifier to place funds before actual loss is suffered, if liability has been incurred.

(A) Both Statements are true (B) Only Statement 1 is true (C) Only Statement 2 is true (D) Both Statements are false

Answer: (C) Only Statement 2 is true

Explanation: Statement 1 is false — as per Gajanan Moreshwar Padhye v. Moreshwar Madan Mantri (1942), the indemnity holder need not wait until actual loss is discharged. Once absolute liability has been incurred (even if not yet paid), the indemnity holder can seek relief and compel the indemnifier to provide funds. Statement 2 correctly states this position of law.

Family Law

Q.17. Under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, what is the minimum period of separation required before a petition for divorce by mutual consent can be filed?

(A) 6 months (B) 1 year (C) 2 years (D) 3 years

Answer: (B) 1 year

Explanation: Section 13B HMA requires the parties to have been living separately for a period of one year or more before filing a mutual consent divorce petition. After filing, a mandatory cooling-off period of 6 months applies before the second motion, though in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017), the Supreme Court held this 6-month period can be waived in deserving cases.

Q.18. Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as amended in 2005, a daughter's rights as a coparcener in joint Hindu family property governed by Mitakshara law accrue:

(A) Only after the death of her father (B) Only upon her marriage (C) By birth, in the same manner as a son (D) Only upon a specific partition deed executed in her favour

Answer: (C) By birth, in the same manner as a son

Explanation: Post the 2005 Amendment, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act was amended to grant daughters coparcenary rights by birth — exactly like sons. In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 11 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that the 2005 Amendment applies irrespective of whether the father was alive on the date of the amendment.

Q.19. Under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which of the following correctly states the 'iddat period'?

(A) Three menstrual courses, or three lunar months if she has no menstrual courses, or until delivery if pregnant (B) Six months from the date of divorce in all cases (C) Forty days from the date of divorce (D) As determined by the local Qazi with no statutory standard

Answer: (A) Three menstrual courses, or three lunar months if she has no menstrual courses, or until delivery if pregnant

Explanation: Section 2(b) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 defines 'iddat period' as: (i) three menstrual courses after divorce, (ii) three lunar months if she has no menstrual courses, and (iii) if pregnant at the time of divorce, until the delivery of the child or the expiration of three lunar months, whichever is later.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Q.20. Under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an arbitration agreement must be in writing. Which of the following is NOT considered a valid 'written' arbitration agreement?

(A) A clause in a signed contract document (B) An exchange of emails referencing the arbitration clause (C) A statement of claim and defence in which one party alleges the existence of an agreement and the other does not deny it (D) An oral agreement witnessed by two persons but not reduced to writing

Answer: (D) An oral agreement witnessed by two persons but not reduced to writing

Explanation: Section 7(4) of the A&C Act recognises a written arbitration agreement as: (a) a document signed by the parties, (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams, or other means of telecommunication, or (c) a statement of claim and defence where one party alleges an arbitration agreement and the other does not deny it. A purely oral agreement, even if witnessed, does not satisfy the 'in writing' requirement.

Q.21. Under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an application to set aside an arbitral award must be made within how many days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award?

(A) 30 days (B) 60 days (C) 90 days, with a possible extension of 30 days on sufficient cause shown (D) 120 days, with no further extension

Answer: (C) 90 days, with a possible extension of 30 days on sufficient cause shown

Explanation: Section 34(3) provides that the application must be made within 3 months (approximately 90 days) from the date of receipt of the award. The court may entertain the application within a further 30 days if sufficient cause is shown. Beyond 120 days in total, no further condonation is possible — confirmed in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470.

Other Laws

Q.22. Under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, what is the fixed compensation payable in case of permanent disablement of a victim of a motor vehicle accident under the 'no-fault liability' scheme?

(A) Rs. 25,000 (B) Rs. 50,000 (C) Rs. 1,00,000 (D) Rs. 2,00,000

Answer: (B) Rs. 50,000

Explanation: Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for no-fault liability with the following fixed compensation amounts — Rs. 50,000 in case of permanent disablement, and Rs. 1,00,000 in case of death. These amounts are payable without proof of fault and are in addition to any compensation that may be awarded under Section 166 (fault-based liability).

Q.23. Under Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, in which of the following situations is the requirement of five years of continuous service waived?

(A) Voluntary resignation after 4 years of service (B) Dismissal for misconduct (C) Death or permanent disablement due to accident or disease (D) Transfer to another branch of the same organisation

Answer: (C) Death or permanent disablement due to accident or disease

Explanation: The Proviso to Section 4(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 waives the 5-year minimum service requirement where the termination of employment is due to death or disablement of the employee. In cases of death, gratuity is paid to the nominee or legal heir. Resignation, dismissal for misconduct, and transfer do not waive the 5-year condition.

Q.24. Match List I (Provisions) with List II (Acts) and select the correct answer using the codes given below.

List I i. Section 63 — punishment for copyright infringement ii. Section 140 — no-fault liability for accidents iii. Section 9A — legal aid committee composition iv. Section 35A — compensatory costs in civil suits

List II

1. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

3. Copyright Act, 1957

4. Advocates Act, 1961

Codes: (A) i-3, ii-1, iii-4, iv-2 (B) i-1, ii-3, iii-2, iv-4 (C) i-3, ii-1, iii-2, iv-4 (D) i-4, ii-1, iii-3, iv-2

Answer: (A) i-3, ii-1, iii-4, iv-2

Explanation: Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 deals with punishment for copyright infringement (i-3). Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 covers no-fault liability (ii-1). Section 9A of the Advocates Act, 1961 governs legal aid committee composition — not more than 9 and not less than 5 members (iii-4). Section 35A of the CPC, 1908 allows compensatory costs up to a maximum of Rs. 5,000 in ordinary cases (iv-2).

Q.25. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 1086) — the Oleum Gas Leak case — the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine of Absolute Liability. Which of the following correctly distinguishes Absolute Liability from Strict Liability under Rylands v. Fletcher?

(A) Absolute liability requires an 'escape' of the dangerous thing from the premises, while strict liability does not (B) Absolute liability has no exceptions, while strict liability allows defences such as Act of God, consent of plaintiff, and act of a stranger (C) Absolute liability applies only to government entities, while strict liability applies to private persons (D) Absolute liability requires proof of negligence, while strict liability is no-fault based

Answer: (B) Absolute liability has no exceptions, while strict liability allows defences such as Act of God, consent of plaintiff, and act of a stranger

Explanation: The key distinction is that Strict Liability under Rylands v. Fletcher permits several defences — Act of God, plaintiff's own default, consent of the plaintiff, act of a third party, and statutory authority. Absolute Liability as laid down in MC Mehta (1987) has no exceptions whatsoever. Any enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity is absolutely liable for all resulting harm, even if every precaution was taken. The rule also requires no 'escape' from the premises — another departure from Rylands v. Fletcher.

Answer Key

AIBE 21 Most Important Topics

Apart from the expected questions, candidates must also have a good knowledge of AIBE 21 important topics. Knowing the important topics will help candidates know what topics carry good weightage in the exam. This will save candidates from any unpredictable situation in the AIBE exam. Below are some of the AIBE 21 important topics and sub-topics:

Most Expected Topics & Sub-topics for AIBE 21